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Abstract. We consider a contracting problem in which a principal hires an agent to manage a
risky project. When the agent chooses volatility components of the output process and the prin-
cipal observes the output continuously, the principal can compute the quadratic variation of the
output, but not the individual components. This leads to moral hazard with respect to the risk
choices of the agent. We identify a family of admissible contracts for which the optimal agent’s
action is explicitly characterized, and, using the recent theory of singular changes of measures for
Itoˆ processes, we study how restrictive this family is. In particular, in the special case of the stan-
dard Homlstrom-Milgrom model with fixed volatility, the family includes all possible contracts.
We solve the principal-agent problem in the case of CARA preferences, and show that the opti-
mal contract is linear in these factors: the contractible sources of risk, including the output, the
quadratic variation of the output and the cross-variations between the output and the contractible
risk sources. Thus, like sample Sharpe ratios used in practice, path-dependent contracts natu-
rally arise when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. In a numerical example,
we show that the loss of efficiency can be significant if the principal does not use the quadratic
variation component of the optimal contract.
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1 Introduction
In many cases managers are in charge of managing exposures to many different types of risk, and
they do that dynamically. A well-known example is the management of a portfolio of many risky
assets. Nevertheless, virtually all existing continuous-time principal-agent models with moral
hazard and continuous output value process suppose that the agent controls the drift of the output
process, and not its volatility components. The drift is what the agent controls in the seminal
models of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), henceforth HM (1987), in which utility is drawn from
terminal payoff, and of Sannikov (2008), in which utility is drawn from inter-temporal payments.
In fact, in those papers the moral hazard cannot arise from volatility choice anyway when there
is only one source of risk (one Brownian motion), because if the principal observes the output
process continuously, there is no moral hazard with respect to volatility choice: the volatility can
be deduced from the output’s quadratic variation process. However, when the agent manages many
non-contractible sources of risk, his choices of exposures to the individual risk sources cannot be
deduced from the output observations, even continuous.
One reason this problem has not been studied is the previous lack of a workable mathematical
methodology to tackle it. When the drift of an Itoˆ process is picked by the agent, this can be for-
mulated as a Girsanov change of the underlying probability measure to an equivalent probability
measure, and there is an extensive mathematical theory behind it. However, changing volatility
components requires singular changes of measures, a problem that, until recently, has not been
successfully studied. We take advantage of recent progress in this regard, and use the new theory
to analyze our principal-agent problem. However, we depart from the usual modeling assump-
tion that the agent’s effort consists in changing the distribution of the output (i.e., the underlying
probability measure), and we, instead, apply the standard stochastic control approach in which the
agent actually changes the values of the controlled process, while the probability measure stays
the same. The reason why all the existing literature uses the former, so-called “weak formulation”,
is that the agent’s problem becomes tractable for any given contract. Instead, we make the agent’s
problem tractable by restricting the family of admissible contracts to a natural set of contracts that
lead to a tractable characterization of the agent’s problem. Essentially, we restrict the admissi-
ble contracts to those for which the agent’s problem is solvable. It could be argued, that, from a
practical point of view, these are the only relevant contracts – the others, for which the principal
does not know what incentives they will provide to the agent, will likely not be offered. More-
over, we show that in the classical Holmstrom-Milgrom model the restricted family is not actually
restricted at all. Thus, in addition to solving the new agency problem with volatility control, we
offer an alternative new way to study classical problems with drift control only.
What we have just described is our main contribution on the methodological side. In principle, our
approach can be applied to any utility functions. However, with terminal payment only, as in HM
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(1987), the only tractable case is the one with CARA (exponential) utility functions. Our main
economic insight of the paper is as follows. The optimal contract is linear (in the CARA case),
but not only in the output process as in HM (1987), rather, also in these factors: the output, its
quadratic variation, the contractible sources of risk (if any), and the cross-variations between the
output and the contractible risk sources. Thus, the use of path dependent contracts naturally arises
when there is moral hazard with respect to risk management. In particular, our model is consistent
with the use of the sample Sharpe ratio when compensating portfolio managers. However, unlike
the typical use of Sharpe ratios, there are parameter values for which the principal rewards the
agent for higher values of quadratic variation, thus, for taking higher risk.
In case there are two sources of risk, and at least one is observable and contractible, the first best
is attained, because there are two risk factors and at least two contractible variables, the output
and at least one risk source; however, to attain the first best, the optimal contract makes use of
the quadratic and cross-variation factors. In case of two non-contractible sources of risk, we solve
numerically a CARA example with a quadratic cost function. In this case, first best is generically
not attainable. Numerical computations show that the loss in expected utility can be significant if
the principal does not use the path-dependent components of the optimal contract.
Literature review. An early continuous-time paper on volatility moral hazard is Sung (1995).
However, in that paper moral hazard is a result of the output being observable only at the terminal
time, and not because of multiple sources of risk. Consequently, the optimal contract is still a
linear function of the terminal output value only. The paper Ou-Yang (2003) shows that the optimal
contract depends on the final value of the output and a “benchmark” portfolio, in an economy in
which all the sources of risk (all the risky assets available for investment) are observable, but the
output is observable at final time only. Some of his results are extended in Cadenillas, Cvitanic´
and Zapatero (2007), who show that, if the market is complete, first-best is attainable by contracts
that depend only on the final value of the output. Thus, second best may be different from first
best only if the market is not complete. In our model, the principal observes the whole path of the
output, but not all the exogenous sources of risk, and also there is a non-zero cost of effort, which
makes the market incomplete. Thus, first best and second best are indeed different for generic
parameter configurations.
More recently, Wong (2013) considers the moral hazard of risk-taking in a model different from
ours: the horizon is infinite, as in Sannikov (2008), and, while the volatility is fixed, the agent’s
effort influences the arrival rate of Poisson shocks to the output process. Lioui and Poncet (2013),
like us, consider a principal-agent problem in which the volatility is chosen by the agent. Theirs
is the first-best framework; however, unlike the above mentioned papers, they assume that the
agent has enough bargaining power to require that the contract be linear in the output and in
a benchmark factor. Working paper Leung (2014) proposes a model in which volatility moral
hazard arises because there is an exogenous factor multiplying the (one-dimensional) volatility
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choice of the agent, and that factor is not observed by the principal. In terms of methodological
techniques, a number of papers in mathematics literature has been developing tools for comparing
stochastic differential systems corresponding to differing volatility structures. We cite them in the
main body of the paper, as we use a lot of their results. Here, we only mention two papers that
not only contribute to the development of those tools, but also apply them to problems in financial
economics: Epstein and Ji (2013) and (2014). Theirs is not the principal-agent problem, but the
ambiguity problem, that is, a model in which the decision-maker has multiple priors on the drift
and the volatility of market factors. There is no ambiguity in our model, it is the agent who controls
the drift and the volatility of the output process.
We start by Section 2 presenting the simplest possible example in our context, with CARA utility
functions and quadratic penalty, we describe the general model in Section 3, in Section 4 we
present the contracting problem and our approach to solving it, we consider the case with no
exogenous contractible factors in Section 5, and conclude with Section 6. The longer proofs are
provided in Appendix.
2 Example: Portfolio Management with CARA Utilities and
quadratic cost
As an illustrative tractable example, we present here the Merton’s portfolio selection problem with
two risky assets, S1 and S2, and a risk-free asset with the continuously compounded rate set equal
to zero. Holding amount vi in asset i, the portfolio value process Xt follows the dynamics
dX =
v1
S1
dS1+
v2
S2
dS2.
Suppose
dSi,t/Si,t = bidt+dBit ,
where Bi are independent Brownian motions and bi are constants. We have then
dXt = [v1,tb1+ v2,tb2]dt+ v1,tdB1t + v2,tdB
2
t .
The principal hires an agent to manage the portfolio, that is, to choose the values of vt = (v1,t ,v2,t),
continuously in time. We assume that the agent is paid only at the final time T in the amount ξT .
The utility of the principal is UP(XT − ξT ) and the utility of the agent is UA(ξT −KvT ) where
KvT :=
∫ T
0 k(vs)ds and k : R2→ R is a non-negative convex cost function.
If the principal only observes the path of X , then she can deduce the value of v21,t + v
2
2,t , but not
the values of v1,t and v2,t separately, which leads to moral hazard. On the other hand, if she also
observes the price path of one of the assets, say S1, then she can deduce the (absolute) values of
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v1,t and of v2,t . To distinguish between these cases, denote by 1O the indicator function that is
equal to one if the path of S1 is observable and contractible, and zero otherwise.
We assume that the principal and the agent have exponential utility functions,
UP(x) =−e−RPx , UA(x) =−e−RAx.
and that the agent’s running cost of portfolio (v1,v2) is of the form
k(v1,v2) =
1
2
β1(v1−α1)2+ 12β2(v2−α2)
2.
Thus, it is costly to move the volatility vi away from αi, and the cost intensity is βi. An interpreta-
tion is that αi are the initial risk exposures of the firm at the time the manager starts his contract.
2.1 First-best contract
Given a “bargaining-power” parameter ρ > 0, the principal’s first-best problem is defined as
sup
v
sup
ξT
E [UP(XT −ξT )+ρUA(ξT −KvT )] .
The first order condition for ξT is then
U ′P(XT −ξT ) = ρU ′A(ξT −KvT ).
With CARA utilities, we obtain
ξT =
1
RA+RP
(
RPXT +RAKvT + log
(
ρRA
RP
))
.
Thus, the optimal first best contract is linear in the final value XT of the output. Plugging back into
the optimization problem, we get that it is equivalent to
−Cρ inf
v
E
[
exp
(
− RARP
RA+RP
(XT −KvT )
)]
=−Cρ inf
v
E
[
E
(
− RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
vs ·dXs
)
exp
(
− RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
f (vs)ds
)]
,
where x · y denotes the inner product, Cρ is a constant, E denotes the Dole´ans-Dade stochastic
exponential∗, and
f (v) := b · v− k(v)− 1
2
RARP
RA+RP
‖v‖2 .
∗Stochastic exponential is defined by
E
(∫ u
t
XsdBs
)
= e−
1
2
∫ u
t |Xs|2ds+
∫ u
t XsdBs .
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Under technical conditions, Girsanov theorem can be applied and the above can be written as
−Cρ inf
v
EP̂
[
exp
(
− RARP
RA+RP
∫ T
0
f (vs)ds
)]
.
for an appropriate probability measure P̂. Thus, first best optimal v = vFB is deterministic, found
by the pointwise maximization of the function f (·), annd given by†
vFBi :=
bi+βiαi
βi+ R¯
, where
1
R¯
:=
1
RA
+
1
RP
. (2.1)
2.2 Second best contracts
We now take into account that it is not the principal who controls v, but the agent. We consider
linear contracts based on the path of the observable portfolio value X , the observable quadratic
variation of X , and, possibly, on S1 via B1, and the co-variation of X and B1. More precisely, let
ξT = ξ0+
∫ T
0
[
ZXs dXs+Y
X
s d〈X〉s+1O
(
Z1s dB
1
s +Y
1
s d〈X ,B1〉s
)
+Hsds
]
, (2.2)
for some constant ξ0, and some adapted processes ZX ,Z1,Y X ,Y 1 and H. To be consistent with the
notation in the general theory that follows later, for future notational convenience we work instead
with arbitrary adapted processes ZX ,Z1,ΓX ,Γ1 and G such that
Y X =
1
2
(
ΓX +RA(ZX)2
)
,
Y 1 = Γ1+RAZX Z1,
H =−G+ 1
2
RA(Z1)2.
Solving the agent’s problem if those processes were deterministic would be easy, but not for arbi-
trary choices of those processes. We will allow them to be stochastic, but we will restrict the choice
of process Gt , motivated by a stochastic control analysis of the agent’s problem, discussed in a later
section. We will see in that section that the natural choice for Gt is Gt :=G(ZXt ,Z
1
t ,ΓXt ,Γ1t ), where
G(ZX ,Z1,ΓX ,Γ1) := sup
v1,v2
g(v1,v2,ZX ,Z1,ΓX ,Γ1)
:= sup
v1,v2
{
−k(v1,v2)+ 12Γ
X(v21+ v
2
2)+Z
X b · v+1OΓ1v1
}
. (2.3)
One of our main results, Theorem 4.1, characterizes the contracts that have a representation of the
above form, with Gt as defined here. In particular, the theorem will show that applying the same
method to the classical Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) problem leads to no loss of generality in the
†In the case the cost βi is zero, the first best volatility vFBi is simply a product of the risk premium bi and the
aggregate prudence 1/R¯.
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choice of possible contracts (including nonlinear contracts), and we will argue that, in general, this
choice of contracts includes all practically relevant contracts.
The agent is maximizing −E[−exp(−RA(ξT −KvT )] with ξT as in (2.2). This turns out to be an
easy optimization problem: by Girsanov theorem (assuming appropriate technical conditions),
similarly as in the first best problem, the agent’s objective can be written as
−EP∗t
[
e−RA
∫ T
0 [gs−Gs]ds
]
,
for an appropriate probability P∗. With our definition of G, we see that this is never larger than
minus one, and it is equal to minus one for any pair (v∗1(s),v
∗
2(s)) (if it exists) that maximizes
gs := g(ZXs ,Z
1
s ,ΓXs ,Γ1s ), s by s, and ω by ω . Thus, the agent would choose one of such pairs.
Notice that this implies that the principal can always make the agent indifferent about one of the
portfolio positions. For example, if b2 is not zero, she can set ZX = −α2β2/b2, and ΓX ≡ β2, to
make g independent of v2, hence the agent indifferent with respect to v2. This is also possible if
there is only one stock, say S2, so that in that case the first best is attained with such a contract, if
we assume that the agent will choose what is best for the principal, when indifferent.
2.2.1 Contractible S1: first best is attained
With two risky assets, if S1 is observed, then also the covariation between S1 and X is observed,
which means that v1 is observed. Since also the quadratic variation is observed, then |v2| is ob-
served, and, if the observed processes are contractible, we would expect the first best to be attain-
able. Indeed, (v∗1,v
∗
2) is obtained by maximizing
g =−1
2
β1(v1−α1)2− 12β2(v2−α2)
2+ZX b · v+Γ1v1+ 12Γ
X‖v‖2+Z1b1+(Z1)2+2Z1ZX v1.
Assume, for example, that b2 6= 0, β2 ≤ β1. Suppose the principal sets
ΓXt ≡ β2,
ZXt ≡−α2β2/b2,
Γ1t =−α1β1−ZXt b1+(β1−β2)vFB1 ,
Z1 ≡ 0.
Then,
g = (β2−β1)
[
1
2
v21− v1vFB1
]
+ const.
We see that the agent is indifferent with respect to which v2 he applies, and he would choose
v∗1 = v
FB
1 . Thus, if, when indifferent, the agent will choose what is best for the principal, he will
choose the first best actions. It can also be verified that the principal will attain the first best
expected utility with this contract.
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2.2.2 Non-contractible S1
If S1 is not contractible, the optimal (v∗1,v
∗
2) is obtained by maximizing
g(v1,v2) =−12β1(v1−α1)
2− 1
2
β2(v2−α2)2+ZX b · v+ 12Γ
X‖v‖2.
Assume, for example, β2 ≤ β1. If ΓX > β2, then the agent will optimally choose |v∗2| = ∞. It is
straightforward to verify that this cannot be optimal for the principal. The same is true if ΓX = β2
and ZX is not equal to (−α2β2). If ΓX = β2 and ZX = −α2β2, then the agent is indifferent with
respect to which v2 to choose. If ΓX < β2 ≤ β1, the optimal positions are
v∗i =
ZX bi+αiβi
βi−ΓX .
The principal’s utility is proportional to
−E
[
e−RP(
∫ T
0 [(1−ZXs )dXs− 12ΓXs d〈X〉s+Gsds])
]
.
With the above choice of v∗i , by a similar Girsanov change of probability measure as above, it is
straightforward to verify that maximizing this is the same as maximizing, over Z = ZX and Γ=ΓX ,
b · v∗(Z,Γ)− 1
2
[RAZ2+RP(1−Z)2]‖v∗‖2− k(v∗(Z,Γ)).
This is a problem that can be solved numerically.‡ We now present a numerical example that will
show us first, that first best is not attained, second, that the optimal contract contains a non-zero
quadratic variation component and that ignoring it can lead to substantial loss in expected utility,
and third, that there are parameter values for which the principal rewards the agent for taking high
risk (unlike the typical use of portfolio Sharpe ratios in practice).
In Figure 1 we plot the percentage loss in the principal’s second best utility certainty equivalent
relative to the first best, when varying the parameter α2, and keeping everything else fixed. The
loss can be significant for extreme values of initial exposure α2. That is, when the initial risk
exposure is far from desirable, the moral hazard cost of providing incentives to the agent to modify
the exposure is high.
‡In Appendix, we provide sufficient conditions for existence of optimizers. Numerically, we found optimizers for
all parametric choices we tried.
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In Figure 2, we compare the principal’s second best certainty equivalent to the one she would
obtain if offering the contract that is optimal among those that are linear in the output, but do not
depend on its quadratic variation. Again we see that the corresponding relative percentage loss
can be large.
Figure 3 plots the values of the coefficient (the sensitivity) multiplying the quadratic variation in
the optimal contract. We see that the principal uses quadratic variation as an incentive tool: for low
values of the initial risk exposure α2 she wants to increase the risk exposure by rewarding higher
variation (the sensitivity is positive), and for its high values she wants to decrease it by penalizing
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high variation (the sensitivity is negative). This is because when the initial risk exposure α2 is not
at the desired value v∗2, incentives are needed to make the agent apply costly effort to modify the
exposure.
In the rest of the paper, we generalize this example and we aim to characterize the contract payoffs
that can be represented as in (2.2), with Gt defined analogously to (2.3).
3 The General Model
We consider the following general model for the output process Xv,a:
Xv,at =
∫ t
0
σs(vs) · (bs(as)ds+dBs), (3.1)
where (v,a) represents the control pair of the agent, allowing also for separate control a of the
drift, where v and a are adapted processes taking values in some subset V ×A of Rm×Rn, for
some (m,n)∈N∗×N∗. Moreover, b : [0,T ]×A −→Rd and σ : V −→Rd are given deterministic
functions such that
‖b(a)‖+‖σ(v)‖ ≤C (1+‖v‖+‖a‖) , (3.2)
for some constant C > 0, and B = (B1, . . . ,Bd) is a d-dimensional Brownian motion, and the
products are inner products of vectors, or a matrix acting on a vector.
The example of delegated portfolio management corresponds to the case in which m = n = d, and
σt(v) := vTσ , bt(a) := b, (3.3)
for some fixed b ∈ Rd and some invertible d× d matrix σ . In that case, the interpretation of the
process Xv,a is that of the portfolio value process dependent on the agent’s choice of the vector
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v of portfolio dollar-holdings in d risky assets with volatility matrix σ , and the vector b of risk
premia. Another special case, when d = 1, v is fixed and the agent controls a only, is the original
continuous-time principal-agent model of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987).
In addition to the output process Xv,a, we may want to allow contracts based on additional observ-
able and contractible risk factors B1, . . . ,Bd0 , for some 1 ≤ d0 < d. For example, St = S0+µSt +
σSB1t might be a model for a contractible stock index.
Usually in contract theory, for sake of tractability, the model is considered in its so-called weak
formulation, in which the agent changes the output process not by changing directly the controls
(v,a), but by changing the probability measure over the underlying probability space. When,
as in standard continuous-time contract models, the effort is present only in the drift, changing
measures is done by the means of the Girsanov theorem. Until recently, though, such a tool had not
been available for singular changes of measure that are needed when changing volatility, as is the
case here. The mathematics to formulate rigorously the weak formulation of our problem is now
available.§ However, we take a different approach: instead of assuming the weak formulation, we
will adopt the standard strong formulation of stochastic control (no changes of measure). We will
still be able to explicitly characterize the solution to the agent’s problem, but only in a restricted
family of admissible contracts. We will provide an assumption under which a contract belongs to
the restricted family, we will argue that the family includes all contracts relevant in practice, and
we will show the assumption is not restrictive if v is fixed. Thus, we also provide a new alternative
way to solve the Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) problem. ¶
We first need to introduce some notation and the framework. We work on the canonical space
Ω of continuous functions on [0,T ], with its Borel σ -algebra F . The d−dimensional canonical
process is denoted B, and F := (Ft)0≤t≤T is its natural filtration. Let P0 denote the d−dimensional
Wiener measure on Ω. Thus, B is a d−dimensional Brownian motion under P0. We denote by E
the expectation operator under P0.
A pair (v,a) of F-predictable processes taking values in V ×A is said to be admissible if∫ T
0
|σs(vs) ·bs(as)|<+∞, P0−a.s., E
[
exp
(
p
∫ T
0
||σs(vs)||2ds
)]
<+∞, for all p> 0, (3.4)
and
E
(∫ ·
0
bs(as) ·dBs
)
is a P0-martingale in L1+η , for some η > 0, (3.5)
§We used the weak formulation in an earlier version of this paper.
¶Interestingly, to derive these results, even though we work with the strong formulation, we need to use the
weak formulation in the proofs. In fact, for the admissible contracts in our restricted family, the weak and the strong
formulation for the agent’s problem are equivalent.
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where
‖σs(vs)‖2−
d0
∑
i=1
∣∣σ is(vs)∣∣2 6= 0. (3.6)
Moreover, we assume that the first d0 entries of vector b do not depend on the control process a
(because they will correspond to exogenous contractible factors). ‖
Remark 3.1. The condition (3.6) is actually not needed to prove our results; it is only needed in
our computations that motivate the definition of the admissible contracts.
As in the example in the previous section, we assume that the agent is paid only at the final time
T in the amount ξT . When the agent chooses the controls (v,a) ∈U , the utility of the principal is
UP(X
v,a
T −ξT ), and the utility of the agent is −e−RA(ξT−K
v,a
0,T ) where
Kv,at,T =
∫ T
t
k(vs,as)ds.
and k : Rm×Rn −→ R is a non-negative (convex) cost function.
4 Second Best with Contractible Risks
In this section, we assume there is exactly one exogenous contractible risk factor, that is, we set
d0 = 1∗∗. Thus, we interpret B1 as the observable and contractible systemic risk.
4.1 Setup
We allow the contract payoff to depend both on the output Xv,a and B1. That is, given a pair
u := (v,a) chosen by the agent, the principal can offer contract payoffs measurable with respect
to F obsT , a σ -field contained in the filtration Fobs := FX
v,a ∨FB1 generated by (Xv,a,B1), where
FXv,a := {FXut }0≤t≤T is the (completed) filtration generated by the output process Xu. Recall that
our assumptions imply that b1 does not depend on a, and introduce the following notation for the
contractible and non-contractible factors:
Bobs,v,a := (Xv,a,B1)T =
∫ ·
0
µs(vs,as)ds+
∫ ·
0
Σs(vs)dBs,
‖The above integrability conditions are suitable for the case of CARA utilities,and they may have to be modified
for other utility functions. We discuss briefly the general case later below. Notice also that condition (3.6) in the case
of portfolio management problem with a = 0 and σ = Id , means that the investor has to invest in at least one of the
non-contractible sources of risk. When there are no contractible source of risk (that is when d0 = 0), this condition
reduces to σs(vs) 6= 01,d .
∗∗We could equally have any subset of {B1, . . . ,Bd} contractible, and the rest non-contractible. We assume that
there is only one contractible risk source for simplicity of notation, and because it is also consistent with the “systemic
risk – stock index” interpretation. We consider the case in which none of the risk sources is contractible in the
following section.
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Bobs−−,v,a :=
∫ ·
0
Σ⊥s (vs)dBs,
where for any (v,a) ∈ V ×A and any s ∈ [0,T ], the R2 vector µs(v,a) and the 2×d matrix Σs(v)
are defined by
µs(v,a) :=
(
σTs (v)bs(a)
0
)
, Σs(v) :=
(
σTs (v)
I1,d
)
,with I1,d :=
(
1 01,d−1
)
,
and where 0p,q denotes the p×q matrix of zeros. Furthermore, Σ⊥s is a (d−2)×d matrix satisfy-
ing, for any v ∈ V and any s ∈ [0,T ],
Σ⊥s (v)Σ
T
s (v) = 0d−2,2 and Σ
⊥
s (v)
(
Σ⊥s
)T
(v) = Id−2.
In other words, we take as the non-contractible sources of risk everything which is ”orthogonal”
to the contractible sources of risk.
Note that the vector
(
Bobs,v,a Bobs−−,v,a
)T
generates the same filtration F as B if and only if the
density of its quadratic variation is invertible. Using the definition of Σ⊥ and Σ, we can readily
compute that
d
〈(
Bobs,v,a Bobs−−,u
)T 〉
s
ds
=
(
Σs(vs)ΣTs (vs) 02,d−2
0d−2,2 Id−2
)
,
which is invertible if and only if Σs(vs)ΣTs (vs) is itself invertible. Simple calculations lead us to
the following necessary and sufficient condition
‖σs(vs)‖2−
(
σ1s (vs)
)2 6= 0,
which is exactly (3.6) when d0 = 1, and thus explains why we assumed (3.6).
4.2 Admissible contracts
In this subsection we will define the set of admissible contract payoffs. To motivate our definition,
consider the agent’s value function at time t, for a given choice of control (v,a) ∈U
V A,v,at := essup
(v′,a′)∈U ((v,a),t)
Et
[
UA(ξT −Kv
′,a′
t,T )
]
, (4.7)
where the set U ((v,a), t) denotes the subset of elements of U which coincide with (v,a), dt ×
P0−a.e. on [0, t]. Note that we have the following explicit relationship between the payoff and the
terminal value of the value function:
ξT =U−1A (V
A,v,a
T
)
. (4.8)
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The idea is to consider the most general representation of the value function V A that we can
reasonably expect to have, and then define the admissible contract payoffs via (4.8). When UA
is a CARA utility function, we may guess from (4.8) that contracts ξT are such that ξT can be
written as a linear combination of various integrals. For example, in the special case d0 = 0 with
no outside contractible factors, we might expect the contracts to satisfy
UA (ξT ) =C exp
[
−RA
(∫ T
0
ZsdXv,as +
∫ T
0
Ysd〈Xv,a〉s+
∫ T
0
Hsds
)]
,
for some constant C < 0 and some adapted processes H,Y,Z. With UA(x) = −e−RAx, this would
give
ξT = C˜+
∫ T
0
ZsdXv,as +
∫ T
0
Ysd〈Xv,a〉s+
∫ T
0
Hsds, (4.9)
for some constant C˜. We will admit exactly the contracts of this form, but, taking into account
(4.8), we will impose some restrictions on process H. We present this reasoning next, in an
informal way, to motivate the definition which will follow thereafter.
Notice that V A,v,at is anFt−measurable function and can thus be written in a functional form as
V A,v,at = V
A(t,Bobs,v,a. ,Bobs−−,v,a. ) = V A(t,(Bobs,v,as )s≤t ,(Bobs−−,v,as )s≤t).
If the value function is smooth in the sense of the Dupire (2009) functional differentiation (see
also Cont and Fournie´ (2013) for more details), then, the Dupire time derivative ∂tV A,v,a exists,
and one can find predictable processes
Z˜v,a =
(
Z˜obs,v,a
Z˜obs−−,v,a
)
and Γ˜v,a =
(
Γ˜obs,v,a 0
0 Γ˜obs−−,v,a
)
,
with Z˜obs,v,a, Z˜obs−−,v,a taking values in R2 and Rd−2, respectively, Γ˜obs,v,a, Γ˜obs−−,v,a taking values in
the spaces S2 and Sd−2 of symmetric matrices, respectively, such that we have the following
generalization of Itoˆ’s rule (see Theorem 1 in Dupire (2009) or Theorem 4.1 in Cont and Fournie´
(2013)),
dV A,v,at = ∂tV
A,v,a
t +
1
2
Tr
[
Γ˜obs,v,at d〈Bobs,v,a〉t
]
+
1
2
Tr
[
Γ˜obs−−,v,at d〈Bobs−−,v,a〉t
]
+ Z˜obs,v,at ·dBobs,v,at
+ Z˜obs−−,v,at ·dBobs−−,v,at
=
(
∂tV A,v,at +
1
2
Tr
[
Γ˜obs,v,at Σt(vt)ΣTt (vt)
]
+
1
2
Tr
[
Γ˜obs−−,v,at
]
+ Z˜obs,v,at ·µ(vt ,at)
)
dt
+
(
ΣTt (vt)Z˜
obs,v,a
t +
(
Σ⊥t
)T
(vt)Z˜
obs−−,v,a
t
)
·dBt , P0−a.s. (4.10)
For instance, if we happen to be in the Markov case in which V A,v,at = f (t,B
obs,v,a
t ,B
obs−−,v,a
t ) for
some smooth function f (t,x,y), then, it follows from Itoˆ’s rule that the processes Z˜obs,v,a, Z˜obs−−,v,a
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and Γ˜obs,v,a, Γ˜obs−−,v,a are given by
Z˜obs,v,at = ∂x f (t,B
obs,v,a
t ,B
obs−−,v,a
t ), Z˜
obs−−,v,a
t = ∂y f (t,B
obs,v,a
t ,B
obs−−,u
t ),
Γ˜obs,v,at = ∂xx f (t,B
obs,v,a
t ,B
obs−−,v,a
t ), Γ˜
obs−−,v,a
t = ∂yy f (t,B
obs,v,a
t ,B
obs−−,v,a
t ),
with ∂x,∂xx,∂y,∂yy denoting partial derivatives with respect to the corresponding variables.
Next, from the martingale optimality principle of the classical stochastic control theory, the dy-
namic programming principle suggests that the process V A,v,at e
RAK
v,a
0,t should be a supermartin-
gale for all admissible controls (v,a), and that it should be a martingale for any optimal control
(v∗,a∗), provided such exists. Writing formally that the drift coefficient of a supermartingale is
non-positive, and that of a martingale must vanish, we obtain the following path-dependent HJB
(Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman) equation:
−∂tV A,v,at +RAV A,v,at G1(t,Zv,at ,Γv,at ) = 0, where (Zv,at ,Γv,at ) :=−
1
RAV
A,v,a
t
(
Z˜v,at , Γ˜
v,a
t
)
, (4.11)
and where
G1(t,z,γ) := sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
g1(t,z,γ,v,a), (4.12)
with
g1(t,z,γ,v,a) := −k(v,a)+ zobs ·µt(v,a)+ 12Tr
[
γobsΣt(v)ΣTt (v)
]
+
1
2
Tr
[
γobs−−
]
.
Substituting the above into (4.10), it follows that, P0−a.s.,
d(V A,v,at e
RAK
v,a
0,t ) =−RAV A,v,at eRAK
v,a
0,t
(
g1(t,Z
v,a
t ,Γ
v,a
t ,vt ,at)−G1(t,Zv,at ,Γv,at )
)
dt
−RAV At eRAK
v,a
0,t
(
Σt(vt)T Zobs,v,at +
(
Σ⊥t
)T
(vt)Z
obs−−,v,a
t
)
·dBt . (4.13)
We then see by directly solving the latter stochastic differential equation that
V A,v,aT = V
A
0 exp
[
RA
(∫ T
0
(
G1(t,Z
v,a
t ,Γ
v,a
t )−
1
2
Tr
[
Γobs,v,at d〈Bobs,v,a〉t
]− 1
2
Tr
[
Γobs−−,v,at
])
dt
)]
× exp
[
−RA
(∫ T
0
Zobs,v,at ·dBobs,v,at +
RA
2
∫ T
0
Zobs,v,at ·d〈Bobs,v,a〉tZobs,v,at
)]
× exp
[
−RA
(∫ T
0
Zobs−−,v,at ·dBobs−−,v,at +
RA
2
∫ T
0
∥∥∥Zobs−−,v,at ∥∥∥2 dt)] , P0−a.s.
Next, we recall that the principal must offer a contract based on the information set Fobs only.
From the definition of G1 we can check that the expression for ξT does not depend on Γobs−−,v,a, and
we expect it also not to depend on Zobs−−,v,a, that is, to have Zobs−−,v,a ≡ 0. In that case, from (4.8),
denoting
Gobs1 (t,z
obs,γobs) := sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
gobs1 (t,z
obs,γobs,v,a), (4.14)
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and
gobs1 (t,z
obs,γobs,v,a) :=−k(v,a)+ zobs ·µt(v,a)+ 12Tr
[
γobsΣt(v)ΣTt (v)
]
.
the contract payoff ξT would be as in the following definition:
Definition 4.1. An admissible contract payoff ξT = ξT (Z,Γ) is aF obsT −measurable random vari-
able that satisfies
UA (ξT (Z,Γ)) =Ce
−RA
∫ T
0
{
Zt ·dBobs,v,at −Gobs1 (t,Zt ,Γt)dt+ 12 Tr
[(
Γt+RAZtZTt
)
d〈Bobs,v,a〉t
]}
. (4.15)
for some constant C< 0, and some pair (Z,Γ) of bounded Fobs−predictable processes with values
in R2 and S2, respectively, that are such that there is a maximizer (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)) ∈ U of
gobs1 (·,Z,Γ), dt×dP0-a.e..
We denote by C the set of all admissible contracts, and by U the set of the corresponding (Z,Γ).
The assumption of boundedness is technical, assumed to simplify the proofs, and it can be relaxed.
If, as in the example section, the optimal Z and Γ are constant processes, then the assumption
is satisfied. The assumption that gobs1 (·,Z,Γ) has a maximizer is needed to prove the incentive
compatibility of contract ξT , and to solve the principal’s problem.
Remark 4.2. In addition to a constant term and the “dt” integral term, with UA a CARA utility
function, an admissible contract is is linear (in the integration sense) in the following factors: the
contractible variables, that is, the output and the contractible sources of risk; and the quadratic
variation and cross-variation processes of the contractible variables. As seen in the numerical
example, the optimal contract generally makes use of all of these components. This is to be con-
trasted with the first best contract, and with the case of controlling the drift only as in Holmstrom-
Milgrom (1987), in which only the output is used,.
Remark 4.3. We argue now that, under technical conditions, an “option-like” contract of the
form ξT = F(Xv,aT ,B
1
T ), for a given function F is an admissible contract. For notational simplicity,
assume b = 0 and a = 0, and consider the PDE, with subscripts denoting partial derivatives, and
with G1 = G1(z1,z2,γ1,γ2,γ3) where γ1 and γ2 are the diagonal entries of a symmetric matrix γ
and γ3 is the value of the off-diagonal entries,
ut +G1(ux,uy,uxx−RAu2x ,uyy−RAu2y ,uxy−RAuxuy) = 0, (t,x) ∈ [0,T )×R, u(T,x,y) = F(x,y).
Then, assuming that the PDE has a smooth solution, it follows from Itoˆ’s formula applied to
u(t,Xv,t ,B1t ) that
F(Xv,0T ,B
1
T ) = u(0,0,0)+
∫ T
0
ux(s,Xv,0s ,B
1
s )dX
v,0
s +
∫ T
0
uy(s,Xv,0s ,B
1
s )dB
1
s
+
∫ T
0
1
2
(
uxx(s,Xv,0s ,B
1
s )d〈Xv,0〉s+uyy(s,Xv,0s ,B1s )d〈B1〉s
)
+
∫ T
0
uxy(s,Xv,0s ,B
1
s )d〈Xv,0,B1〉s
−
∫ T
0
Gobs1
(
ux,uy,uxx−RAu2x ,uyy−RAu2y ,uxy−RAuxuy
)
(s,Xv,0s ,B
1
s )ds.
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Thus, F(Xv,0T ,B
1
T ) is of the form ξT (Z,Γ), where the vector Zt has entries given by ux(t,X
v,0
t ,B1t )
and uy(t,X
v,0
t ,B1t ), and where the matrix Γt has diagonal entries given by (uxx−RAu2x)(t,Xv,0t ,B1t ),
(uyy−RAu2y)(t,Xv,0t ,B1t ), and off-diagonal entries given by (uxy−RAuxuy)(t,Xv,0t ,B1t ).
At the end of this section, we show that, as desired, under the above definition of admissible
contracts, one can characterize the agent’s optimal action. Introduce the set of the controls that are
optimal for maximizing gobs1 , given Z,Γ:
V1(Z,Γ) = {(v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)), such that the conditions of Definition 4.1 are satisfied}.
The next proposition states that for a given contract ξT (Z,Γ)∈C, any control (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ))∈
V1(Z,Γ) is optimal for the agent.
Proposition 4.1. An admissible contract ξT (Z,Γ) ∈ C as defined in (4.15) is incentive compatible
with V1(Z,Γ). That is, given the contract ξT (Z,Γ), any control (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)) ∈V1(Z,Γ) is
optimal for the agent. Moreover, the corresponding agent’s value function satisfies equation (4.13)
with (Zobs,Zobs−−) = (Z,0), and (Γobs,Γobs−−) = (Γ,0).
Proof: Let (Z,Γ) be an arbitrary pair process in U, and consider the agent’s problem with contract
ξT (Z,Γ):
V A,v,at
(
ξT (Z,Γ)
)
:= essup
(v′,a′)∈U (t,(v,a))
Et
[
UA
(
ξT (Z,Γ)−Kv
′,a′
t,T )
]
, P0−a.s.
We first compute, for all (v′,a′) ∈U (t,(v,a)),
UA (ξT (Z,Γ))eRAK
v′,a′
t,T =UA (ξt(Z,Γ))E
(
−RA
∫ .
t
Zr ·Σr(v′r)dBr
)
T
× exp
(
RA
∫ T
t
[
Gobs1 (r,Zr,Γr)−gobs1 (r,Zr,Γr,v′r,a′r)
]
dr
)
, P0−a.s.,
where UA(ξt(Z,Γ)) has the same form (4.15) as UA(ξT (Z,Γ)), when we substitute t for T .
Since Z is bounded by definition and σ satisfies the linear growth condition (3.2), we have by
definition of U (see (3.4) in particular) that
E
[
exp
(
R2A
2
∫ T
0
∥∥ΣTr (v′r)Zr∥∥2 dr)]<+∞.
Hence, by Novikov criterion, we may define a probability measure P¯ equivalent to P0 via the
density
dP¯
dP0
|FT = E
(
−RA
∫ .
t
Zr ·Σr(v′r)dBr
)
T
.
Then,
Et
[
UA
(
ξT (Z,Γ)
)
eRAK
v′,a′
t,T
]
=UA
(
ξt(Z,Γ)
)
EP¯t
[
eRA
∫ T
t G
obs
1 (r,Zr,Γr)−gobs1 (r,Zr,Γr,v′r,a′r)dr
]
.
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Since Gobs1 −gobs1 ≥ 0, we see that
Et
[
UA
(
ξT (Z,Γ)
)
eRAK
v′,a′
t,T
]
≤UA
(
ξt(Z,Γ)
)
,
and by the arbitrariness of (v′,a′) ∈U (t,(v,a)), it follows that V A,v,at (ξ (Z,Γ))≤UA
(
ξt(Z,Γ)
)
.
Thus, any control (v∗,a∗) for which Gobs1 (r,Zr,Γr) = g
obs
1 (Zr,Γr,v
∗
r ,a
∗
r ), attains the upper bound.
Hence,
V A,v,at
(
ξT (Z,Γ)
)
=UA
(
ξt(Z,Γ)
)
,
and the dynamics of V A,v,at are as stated. 2
Remark 4.4. When UA is not a CARA utility function, the same approach would work if the agent
draws utility/disutility of the form UA(ξT )−Kv,aT , that is, if the cost of effort is separable from the
agent’s utility function ††. For example, in the case in which only X = Xv,a is contractible and
σ = Id , we would define admissible contracts ξT = ξT (Z,Γ) to be those that satisfy
UA(ξT (Z,Γ)) = C˜+
∫ T
0
ZudXu+
∫ T
0
1
2
Γud〈X〉u−
∫ T
0
G˜0(Zu,Γu)du,
for some constant C˜, some FXv,a−predictable processes Z and Γ with values in R, and a process
process G˜0(Zt ,Γt) defined similarly as above. Thus, UA(ξT ), rather than ξT , would be required to
be linear (in the integration sense). However, while the agent’s problem would be tractable, the
difficulty is that, in general, it would be hard to solve the principal’s maximization problem.
4.2.1 How general is class C?
This question is related to the possibility of HJB characterization of the value function in the non-
Markovian case, which has been approached by introducing and studying so-called second-order
BSDEs; see, e.g., Soner, Touzi and Zhang (2012). However, identification (or even existence) of
the optimal control is a very hard task, which may require strong regularity assumptions. Using
results of that recent theory, we prove in Appendix that, in the case of drift control only (as in
Hormstrom and Milgrom (1987)) any feasible contract payoff has the form (4.15), while, with
volatility control, this is true under additional regularity assumptions. More precisely, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 4.1. If v is uncontrolled and fixed to v0 ∈ V , and if there is a constant C > 0 and
ε ∈ [1,+∞) such that
lim
‖a‖→+∞
k(v0,a)
‖a‖ =+∞, ‖Dak(v0,a)‖ ≤C
(
1+‖a‖ε) ,
††A possible interpretation is that the function k represents, in a stylized way, joint effects of the risk aversion to
the choice of v and a and of their cost.
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(a condition satisfied in the case of quadratic cost), then any F obsT -measurable random variable
ξT for which the agent’s value function is well-defined can be represented as in (4.15). More
generally, (4.15) is implied by “smoothness” of the non-martingale component of the agent’s
value function in the sense of existence of a “second-order sensitivity” process Γ as in Assumption
7.1 in Appendix.
Basically, by imposing the form (4.15) with an appropriately chosen Gobs1 , we ensure that the
corresponding contract payoff is sufficiently smooth to make the agent’s value function process
also smooth. In other words, with such a contract, the value function of the agent is a solution to
the path-dependent HJB equation that we derived heuristically in (4.11). In the existing literature
(in which only drift control is present) this is always the case, whether the model is with finite or
infinite horizon. Indeed, the martingale representation and the comparison theorem type result is
always used, which is equivalent to the path dependent HJB equation. It seems unlikely that one
could solve the agent’s problem for contracts for which the value function would be so degenerate
that it would not satisfy this weak form of smoothness. In practice, this means that the principal
also wouldn’t know what the agent would do given such contracts, and the principal would likely
decide not to consider them.
4.3 Attainability of first best.
In this section we assume that drift effort a is uncontrolled by the agent and fixed to the value
of zero. Moreover, we adopt the setting of (3.3), with V = Rd and CARA utility functions. We
show that first best is always attainable when the cost function is zero. In other words, with no
constraints on the choice of v and no cost of choosing it, there is no agency friction.
For a pair (Z,Γ) ∈ R2×S2, we introduce the notation
Z :=
(
z1
z2
)
and Γ :=
(
γ1 γ2
γ2 γ3
)
.
If we choose γ1 < 0 and assume that the cost k(v,0) is 0, then it is easy to see that the optimal
v∗ ∈ Rd in the definition of Gobs1 (Z,Γ) is the unique solution of the following equation
z1σb+ γ2σ.1+ γ1
d
∑
i=1
σ.i · v∗σ.i = 0,
where for any 1≤ i≤ d, σ.i is the i-th column of matrix σ . This leads directly to
v∗ =−1
γ 1
(σσT )−1 (z1σb+ γ2σ.1) . (4.16)
The principal may choose the values
z1 :=
RP
RA+RP
, γ1 :=− RAR
2
P
(RA+RP)2
, γ2 := 0,
19
and arbitrary values for z2 and γ3. Then, this contract is clearly admissible, since Z and Γ are
bounded and constant, and it follows from (4.16) that when σ = Id , it implements the following
optimal volatility
v∗ =
RA+RP
RARP
b.
When k = 0, this is exactly equal to the first best volatility vFB obtained in (2.1) (for d = 2, but
it holds for any d), as can easily be verified, and the same holds for general σ . This result is in
agreement with Cadenillas, Cvitanic´ and Zapatero (2007), who show that in a frictionless and a
complete market (i.e., zero cost of volatility effort and the number of Brownian motions equal
to the number of observable assets), with arbitrary utility functions, first best is attainable using
a contract that depends only on the final value of the output. We see here that with exponential
utility functions completeness is not necessary, and a linear contract is optimal. Indeed, with the
above z1 and Γ, we have, setting z2 = 0,
ξT (Z,Γ) = const.+
RP
RA+RP
XT ,
which is the same as the first best contract when k(v) = 0.
4.4 The principal’s problem with CARA utility
In this section, we assume that the utilities are exponential for both the principal and the agent, that
is we have UI(x) =−e−RIx, I = RA,RP. Fix an admissible ξT (Z,Γ) ∈ C and introduce the notation
Z =
(
ZX
ZB
1
)
and Γ=
(
ΓX ΓXB1
ΓXB1 ΓB1
)
.
The principal maximizes the expected utility of her terminal payoff Xv,aT − ξT (Z,Γ). Since the
contract ξT (Z,Γ) is incentive compatible in the sense of Proposition 4.1, the optimal volatility and
drift choices by the agent correspond to any (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)) ∈V1(Z,Γ). Then, assuming that
the agent lets the principal choose among the control choices that are optimal for the agent, the
principal problem is:
sup
(Z,Γ)∈U , (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ))∈V1(Z,Γ)
E
[
UP
(
Xv,aT −ξT (Z,Γ)
)]
.
Denoting (v∗,a∗) := (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)), and substituting the expression for ξT (Z,Γ), we get
Xv,aT −ξT (Z,Γ) = −C+
∫ T
0
(
σTs (v
∗
s )bs(a
∗
s )(1−ZXs )−
1
2
∥∥σs(v∗s )∥∥2(ΓXs +RA∣∣ZXs ∣∣2))ds
+
∫ T
0
(
Gobs1 (s,Zs,Γs)−
1
2
(
ΓB
1
s +RA
∣∣ZB1s ∣∣2))ds
−
∫ T
0
(
ΓXB
1
s +RAZ
X
s Z
B1
s
)
d〈X ,B1〉s
−
∫ T
0
ZB
1
s d(B
obs,v∗,a∗)1s +
∫ T
0
(
1−ZXs
)
v∗s ·σdBv
∗,a∗
s , P0− a.s.
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Introduce a vector θ ∗ := σs(v∗s ) and denote its first entry θ ∗1 (s), and denote by θ
∗
−1(s) the (d−1)-
dimensional vector without the first entry. Arguing exactly as in the proof of Proposition 4.1, in
particular, by isolating the appropriate stochastic exponential, it follows that the principal problem
reduces to maximizing
θ ∗s (Z,Γ) ·bs(a∗s (Z,Γ))
(
1−ZX)− 1
2
‖θ ∗s (Z,Γ)‖2
(
ΓX +RA
∣∣ZX ∣∣2)+Gobs1 (s,Z,Γ)
− 1
2
(
ΓB
1
+RA
∣∣ZB1∣∣2)− (ΓXB1 +RAZX ZB1)θ1(s,Z,Γ)
− RP
2
[∥∥θ ∗−1(s,Z,Γ)∥∥2 (1−ZX)2+ (θ ∗1 (s,Z,Γ)(1−ZX)−ZB1)2] . (4.17)
Since the supremum in the definition of Gobs1 (s,Z,Γ) is attained at (v
∗,a∗), this is equivalent to the
minimization problem
inf
Z,Γ,v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)
{
−θ ∗(s,Z,Γ) ·bs(a∗s (Z,Γ))+
1
2
‖θ ∗(Z,Γ)‖2 RA
(
ZX
)2
+ k(v∗,a∗)+
RA
2
(
ZB
1
)2
+RAZX ZB
1
θ ∗1 (s,Z,Γ)+
RP
2
[
‖θ ∗s (Z,Γ)‖2
(
1−ZX)2−2θ ∗1 (s,Z,Γ)(1−ZX)ZB1 +(ZB1)2 ]}.
(4.18)
Note that if minimizers Z∗, Γ∗, v∗ and a∗ exist, they are then necessarily deterministic, since b,
σ and k are non-random. By Proposition 4.1, the contract ξT (Z∗,Γ∗) is incentive compatible for
(v∗(Z∗,Γ∗),a∗(Z∗,Γ∗)), if ξT (Z∗,Γ∗) ∈ C. Moreover, as we have just shown, it is also optimal for
the principal’s problem, that is, we have proved the following.
Theorem 4.2. Consider the set of admissible contracts ξT (Z,Γ) ∈ C. Then, the contract that is
optimal in that set and provides the agent with expected utility V A0 < 0 is ξT (Z
∗,Γ∗) corresponding
to Z∗,Γ∗,v∗,a∗ which are the minimizers in (4.18), provided such minimizers exist, with v∗ 6= 0.
Moreover, the contract cash constant C is given by C :=− 1RA log(−V A0 ).
Proof. The only thing to check here is the admissibility of the contract ξT (Z∗,Γ∗), but this is just
a consequence of the optimizers being deterministic, noting that condition (3.6) is satisfied when
v∗ 6= 0. 2
Next, we provide here sufficient conditions for existence of at least one minimizer of (4.18) when,
for simplicity, there is no optimization with respect to a, and when the cost function k is super-
quadratic. The case of a quadratic k is actually harder and is treated in Appendix in Proposition
7.1.
Proposition 4.2. Assume that the agent does not control the drift, i.e. a = 0, and consider the
setting of (3.3) with V =Rd . Assume moreover that the cost function k(v) := k(v,0) is at least C1
and satisfies for some constant C > 0
‖∇k(v)‖ ≤C(1+‖v‖1+ε) , for some ε > 0, and lim
‖v‖→+∞
k(v)
‖v‖2 =+∞.
Then, the infimum in (4.18) is attained.
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5 Second-best with non-contractible risks
Consider now the case in which the only contractible process is Xv,a. In that case, we need to mod-
ify our approach by adopting the following changes, as can be verified using similar arguments.
First of all, the principal can now only offer contract payoffs measurable with respect to FX
v,a
T , a
sigma-field contained in the filtration FXv,a := {FXv,at }0≤t≤T generated by the output process Xv,a.
Following exactly the same intuition from the stochastic control theory as in the previous section,
we introduce the function Gobs0 , the counterpart of the function G
obs
1 above, defined for any (s,z,γ)∈
[0,T ]×R×R by
Gobs0 (s,z,γ) := sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
gobs0 (s,z,γ,v,a)
:= sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
{
σTs (v)bs(a)z+
1
2
‖σs(v)‖2 γ− k(v,a)
}
, z,γ ∈ R.
Once again, if a maximizer exists, we denote it by (v∗(z,γ),a∗(z,γ)). We now introduce the set of
admissible contracts in this case.
Definition 5.2. An admissible contract payoff ξT = ξT (Z,Γ) is an FX
v,a
T −measurable random
variable that satisfies
UA
(
ξ 0T (Z,Γ)
)
:=Ce−RA
∫ T
0
{
ZtdX
v,a
t −Gobs0 (t,Zt ,Γt)dt+ 12
(
Γt+RAZ2t
)
d〈Xv,a〉t
]}
. (5.19)
for some constant C≥ 0, and some pair (Z,Γ) of bounded FXv,a−predictable processes with values
in R, and such that there is a maximizer (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)) ∈U of gobs0 (·,Z,Γ), dt×dP0-a.e..
We denote by C0 the set of all admissible contracts, and by U0 the set of the corresponding (Z,Γ).
Similarly as before, we introduce the set of controls that are optimal for maximizing gobs0 , given
Z,Γ:
V0(Z,Γ) = {(v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)), such that the conditions of Definition 5.2 are satisfied}.
The following proposition is the analogue of Proposition 4.1 in this setting, and can be proved by
the same argument.
Proposition 5.3. An admissible contract ξ 0T (Z,Γ), as defined in (5.19), is incentive compatible
with V0(Z,Γ). That is, given the contract ξ 0T (Z,Γ), any control in V0(Z,Γ) is optimal for the
agent’s problem.
Accordingly, the principal’s problem is modified as follows, denoting again for notational simplic-
ity (v∗,a∗) := (v∗(Z,Γ),a∗(Z,Γ)), and assuming UP(x) =−e−RPx:
inf
(Z,Γ,v∗,a∗)∈U0×V0(Z,Γ)
E
[
exp
{
RP
(∫ T
0
(
σTs (v
∗
s )bs(a
∗
s )(Zs−1)+
1
2
‖σs(v∗s )‖2
(
Γs+RAZ2s
))
ds
−
∫ T
0
Gobs0 (u,Zu,Γu)du+
∫ T
0
(Zs−1)dXv∗,a∗s
)}]
.
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Similarly, as above, denote by θ ∗s the vector σs(v∗s ). The principal’s problem then becomes
inf
Z,Γ,v∗,a∗
{
−θ ∗s (Z,Γ)bs(a∗s )+
RA
2
‖θ ∗s (Z,Γ)‖2 Z2+ k (v∗,a∗)+
RP
2
‖θ ∗s (Z,Γ)‖2 (1−Z)2
}
. (5.20)
We then have, similarly as before,
Theorem 5.3. Consider the set of admissible contracts ξ 0T (Z,Γ) ∈ C0. Then, the optimal contract
that provides the agent with optimal expected utility V A0 is the one corresponding to Z
∗,Γ∗,v∗,a∗
which are the minimizers in (5.20), provided such minimizers exist with v∗ 6= 0. Moreover, the
contract cash term in the contract is given by − 1RA log(−V A0 ).
The analogue of Proposition 4.2 still holds in this context, with the same statement and the same
proof.
6 Conclusions
We build a framework for studying moral hazard in dynamic risk management, using recently
developed mathematical techniques. While those allow us to solve the problem in which utility
is drawn solely from terminal payoff, we leave for a future paper the similar problem on infinite
horizon with inter-temporal payments, a la Sannikov (2008). In the case of terminal payoff, we
find that the optimal contract is implemented by compensation based on the output, its quadratic
variation (corresponding in practice to the sample variance used when computing Sharpe ratios),
the contractible sources of risk, and the cross-variations between the output and the risk sources.
(Or, it could be implemented by derivatives that provide such payoffs.) It is an open question how
much, if any, mathematical generality we lose in restricting the family of admissible contracts
the way we do. We argue that from a practical perspective, we do include all the contracts that
are likely to be considered by a principal in the real world. In our framework it is assumed that
the principal knows the model parameters (for example, the mean return rates and the variance-
covariance matrix of the returns of the assets the hedge fund manager is investing in). In practice,
the principal may not have that information, and it would be of interest to extend the model to
include this adverse selection problem. This might be approached by combining our model with
the one of Leung (2014).
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7 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 4.1. We adapt arguments of Soner, Touzi & Zhang (2011, 2012, 2013). In Step
1 we transform our problem to the weak formulation used in those papers. The agent’s problem is
then analyzed in Step 2. Finally, Step 3 specializes to the case of uncontrolled volatility.
Step 1: An alternative formulation of the agent’s problem
Let us consider the following family of processes, indexed by admissible processes v:
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Mv· :=

∫ ·
0
σs(vs) ·dBs
B1·
...
Bd0·∫ ·
0
Σ⊥s (vs)dBs

=

∫ ·
0
Σs(vs)dBs∫ ·
0
Σ⊥s (vs)dBs
 , P0−a.s., (7.1)
where, similarly as in Section 4.1, for any s ∈ [0,T ] and any v ∈ V the (d0+1)×d matrix Σ(v) is
defined by
Σs(v) :=
(
σTs (v)
Id0,d
)
,with Id0,d :=
(
Id0 0d0,d−d0
)
.
Furthermore, Σ⊥s is now a (d−d0−1)×d matrix satisfying, for any s ∈ [0,T ] and any v ∈ V ,
Σ⊥s (v)Σs(v)
T = 0d−d0−1,d0+1 and Σ
⊥
s (v)(Σ
⊥
s )
T (v) = Id−d0−1.
We then setPm to be the set of probability measures Pv on (Ω,F ) of the form
Pv := P0 ◦ (Mv. )−1 , for any admissible v. (7.2)
We recall that by Bichteler (1981), we can also define a pathwise version of the quadratic variation
process 〈B〉 and of its density process with respect to the Lebesgue measure, a positive symmetric
matrix α̂:
α̂t :=
d〈B〉t
dt
.
The elements of family correspond to possible choices of the volatility vector σs(v) by the agent.‡‡
We remark that by our definitions, we have teh following weak formulation:
The law of (B, α̂ ) under Pv = the law of
(
Mv,
(
Σs(v)Σs(v)T 0d0+1,d−d0−1
0d−d0−1,d0+1 Id−d0−1
))
under P0.
Moreover, exactly as in Section 4.1, the density of the quadratic variation of B is invertible under
Pv, if and only if Σs(v)Σs(v)T is invertible, which can be shown to be equivalent to
‖σs(vs)‖2−
d0
∑
i=1
∣∣σ is(vs)∣∣2 6= 0,
which is the same as (3.6).
‡‡This family could also be characterized by considering all the choices of control u for which there exists at least
one strong solution to the SDE for M (see Soner, Touzi and Zhang (2011)), or, equivalenntly, to a certain martingale
problem (see Kazi-Tani, Possamaı¨ and Zhou (2013) and Neufeld and Nutz (2014)).
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Then, according to Lemma 2.2 in Soner, Touzi, Zhang (2013), for every admissible v, there exists
a F-progressively measurable mapping βv : [0,T ]×Ω−→ Rd such that
B = βv(Mv), P0−a.s., α̂s(B) =
(
Σs(βv(B))ΣTs (βv(B)) 0d0+1,d−d0−1
0d−d0−1,d0+1 Id−d0−1
)
, Pv−a.s.
This implies in particular, that the process
Wt :=
∫ t
0
α−1/2s dBs, P−a.s, (7.3)
is a Rd-valued, P-Brownian motion, for every P∈Pm§§. In particular, this implies that the canon-
ical process B admits the following dynamics, for every admissible v,
B1t = B
1
0+
∫ t
0
σs(vs(W·)) ·dWs, Pv−a.s.,
B jt = B
j
0+W
j−1
t , Pv−a.s., j = 2 . . .d0+1, if d0 > 0,B
d0+2
t
...
Bdt
=
B
d0+2
0
...
Bd0
+∫ t
0
Σ⊥s (vs(W·))dWs, Pv−a.s. (7.4)
Thus, the first coordinate of the canonical process is the desired output process, observed by both
the principal and the agent, the following d0 coordinates represent the contractible sources of risk,
while the remaining ones represent the factors that are not contractible.
The introduction of the controlled drift bs(as) can now be done by using Girsanov transformations
¶¶. We define for any (v,a) ∈U and any Pv ∈Pm, the equivalent probability measure Pv,a by
dPv,a
dPv
:= E
(∫ ·
0
bs(as) ·dWs
)
T
,
and we denote byP := (Pv,a)(v,a)∈U .
Next, by Girsanov theorem, the following process W a is a Pv,a-Brownian motion
W at :=Wt−
∫ t
0
bs(as)ds, Pv,a−a.s. (thus also Pv−a.s.)
§§Notice that we should actually have considered a family (WP)P∈Pm , since the stochastic integral in (7.3) is, a
priori, only defined P-a.s. However, we can use results of Nutz (2012) to provide an aggregated version of this family,
which is the process we denote by W . That result holds under a ”good” choice of set theoretic axioms that we do not
specify here.
¶¶ Note that by assumption that the first d0 entries of vector b do not depend on a, the choice of control a does not
modify the distribution of the exogenous sources of risk (B2, . . . ,Bd0+1).
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Then, by (7.4), we have
B1t = B
1
0+
∫ t
0
σs(vs(W·)) · (bs(as)ds+dW as ) , Pv,a−a.s.,
B jt = B
j
0+W
j−1
t , Pv,a−a.s., j = 2 . . .d0+1,B
d0+2
t
...
Bdt
=
B
d0+2
0
...
Bd0
+∫ t
0
Σ⊥s (vs(W·))dWs, Pv,a−a.s., (7.5)
which can then be rewritten as
Bobs :=
 B
1
t
...
Bd0+1t
=
 B
1
0
...
Bd0+10
+∫ t
0
µs(vs(W·),as)ds+
∫ t
0
Σs(vs(W·))dW as , Pv,a−a.s.,
Bobs−− :=
B
d0+2
t
...
Bdt
=
B
d0+2
0
...
Bd0
+∫ t
0
Σ⊥s (vs(W·))dWs, Pv,a−a.s., (7.6)
where for any s ∈ [0,T ] and any (v,a) ∈U , µs(v,a) is a Rd0+1 vector defined by
µs(v,a) :=
(
σTs (v)bs(a)(
Id0 0d0,d0−d
)) .
Notice then that, for a given measure P ∈P , according to (7.6), we can always find two m-
dimensional and n−dimensional vectors vP and aP such that
Bobst = B
obs
0 +
∫ t
0
µs
(
vPs ,a
P
s
)
ds+
∫ t
0
Σs
(
vPs
)
dW a
P
s , P−a.s.,
which gives us the following correspondence
vP
v,a
(B·) = v(W·), aP
v,a
(B·) = a(B·), dt×Pv,a−a.e.
In particular, this implies that vP
a,v
= vP
v
, for any admissible control a. We will therefore always
write vP
v
from now on.
Using the above notation, we re-write the value function of the agent as:
V A,wt := essup
P
P′∈P(t,P)
EP
′
t
[
UA(ξT −KP
′
t,T )
]
, P−a.s., for all P ∈P, (7.7)
where for any P ∈P , the setP(t,P) is the set of probability measures inP which agree with P
onFt , and where we have
KPt,T :=
∫ T
t
k(vPs ,a
P
s )ds.
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The definition of the value function depends a priori explicitly on the measure P, and we should
instead have defined a family (V A,w,Pt )P∈P . Indeed, it is not immediately clear whether this family
can be aggregated into a universal process V A,w or not. Such problems are inherent to the weak
formulation of stochastic control problems involving volatility control of the diffusion, see Soner,
Touzi and Zhang (2011), Nutz and Soner (2012), Nutz and van Handel (2013), Possamaı¨, Royer
and Touzi (2013), Epstein and Ji (2013). In our context, it suffices to remark that following similar
arguments as in Section 5 of Possamaı¨, Royer and Touzi (2013), one can show that family P
satisfies their condition 5.4, and to remark that their approach can be extended to non-martingale
measures (as in Nutz and van Handel (2013)). This allows us to define properly the value function
of the agent∗∗∗.
Step 2: Solving the agent’s problem
Let us start by fixing some (v,a) ∈ U . Then, under sufficient integrability conditions for ξT , the
process (eRAK
Pv,a
0,t V A,wt )0≤t≤T is a ca`dla`g, Pv,a-supermartingale for the filtration F, which is equal to
Fobs∨Fobs−−. Using results of Soner, Touzi and Zhang (2012), we know that the martingale represen-
tation property still holds under Pv,a, so that, by Doob-Meyer’s decomposition, there exists a pair
of processes Z˜v,a,obs and Z˜v,a,obs−−, which are respectively FobsP
v,a
and Fobs−−P
v,a
-predictable process,
and an FP
v,a
-adapted process A˜v,a, which is non-decreasing Pv,a− a.s., such that, after applying
Itoˆ’s formula, we have the decomposition
V A,wt =UA(ξT )+
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws k(v
Pv
s ,a
Pv,a
s )ds−
∫ T
t
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,s Z˜v,a,obss ·Σs(vP
v
s )dW
aP
v,a
s
−
∫ T
t
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,s Z˜v,a,obs−−s ·Σ⊥s (vP
v
s )dW
aP
v,a
s +
∫ T
t
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,s dA˜v,as , Pv,a−a.s.
By definition of W a, we deduce that, Pv,a−a.s.,
V A,wt =UA(ξT )−
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws
(
µs(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zv,a,obss + `s(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zv,a,obs−−s − k(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s )
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws Z
v,a,obs
s ·Σs(vP
v
s )dWs+
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws Z
v,a,obs−−
s ·Σ⊥s (vP
v
s )dWs−
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws dA
v,a
s ,
where we defined
Zv,a,obst :=−
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,t
RAV
A,w
t
Z˜v,a,obst , Z
v,a,obs−−
t :=−
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,t
RAV
A,w
t
Z˜v,a,obs−−t , A
v,a
t :=−
∫ t
0
e−RAK
Pv,a
0,s
RAV
A,w
s
dA˜v,as ,
and for any s ∈ [0,T ] and any (v,a) ∈ V ×A
`s(v,a) := Σ⊥s (v)bs(a).
∗∗∗Notice that to be completely rigorous, we should then introduce the so-called universal filtration onΩ, completed
by the polar sets generated by P , to which the process V A,w would then be adapted; see the references mentioned
above
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Next, using the pathwise construction of the quadratic co-variation of Bichteler (1981), it is ac-
tually possible to aggregate the families (Zv,a,obs)(v,a)∈U , (Zv,a,obs−−)(v,a)∈U into universal processes
Zobs and Zobs−− (see for instance Nutz & van Handel (2013)), so that we obtain for all (v,a) ∈ U ,
Pv,a−a.s.,
V A,wt =−UA(ξT )−
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws
(
µs(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zobss + `s(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zobs−−s − k(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s )
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws Z
obs
s ·Σs(vP
v
s )dWs+
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws Z
obs−−
s ·Σ⊥s (vP
v
s )dWs−
∫ T
t
RAV A,ws dA
v,a
s .
Under this form, we see that the triplet (V A,w,(Zobs,Zobs−−),(Av,a)(v,a)∈U ), with
Av,at :=−RA
∫ t
0
V A,ws dA
v,a
s ,
is a solution to the (linear) second-order backward stochastic differential equation (2BSDE for
short), as introduced by Soner, Touzi & Zhang (2012), with terminal condition UA(ξT ) and gener-
ator F : [0,T ]×R×Rd0+1×Rd−d0−1,×V ×A −→ R, defined by
F(t,y,zobs,zobs−−,v,a) := RAy
(
µt(v,a) · zobs+ `t(v,a) · zobs−−− k(v,a)
)
.
Indeed, according to Definition 3.1 in Soner, Touzi & Zhang (2012), the only thing that we have
to check is that the family of non-decreasing processes (Av,a)(v,a)∈U ) satisfies the so-called mini-
mality condition
Av,at = essinf
Pv,a
(v′,a′)∈U (t,(v,a))
EP
v′,a′
t
[
Av
′,a′
T
]
, for any (v,a) ∈U .
However, this property can be immediately deduced from the definition of the value function V A,w
as an essup (see Step (ii) of the proof of Theorem 4.6 in Soner, Touzi & Zhang (2012) for similar
arguments). Moreover, solving the above equation, we get
V A,wt = V
A,w
0 exp
[
−RA
∫ t
0
(
k(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s )−µs(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zobss − `s(vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s ) ·Zobs−−s
)
ds
]
× exp
[
−R
2
A
2
∫ t
0
(∥∥∥ΣTs (vPvs )Zobss ∥∥∥2+∥∥Zobs−−s ∥∥2)ds+RAAv,at ]
× exp
[
−RA
(∫ t
0
Zobss ·Σs(vP
v
s )dWs+
∫ t
0
Zobs−−s ·Σ⊥s (vP
v
s )dWs
)]
, Pv,a−a.s. (7.8)
The difficulty is that, a priori, we do not know anything about the non-decreasing processes Av,a,
and thus, it is not in general possible to characterize further the optimal choice of the agent. We
will show below that this difficulty disappears when the volatility is not controlled. When it is
controlled, there are still cases for which it is possible to obtain further information about Av,a,
which correspond basically to the situations where the contract ξT is smooth enough. So far, the
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most general result in this direction has been obtained by Peng, Song and Zhang (2014), and can
be written in our context as the following assumption, denoting,
Gobsd0 (s,z,γ) := sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
gobs0 (s,z,γ,v,a)
:= sup
(v,a)∈V ×A
{
1
2
Tr
[
γΣs(v)ΣTs (v)
]
+µs(v,a) · z− k(v,a)
}
.
Assumption 7.1. The contract ξT is such that there exists a Fobs-predictable process Γobs taking
values in the set of real (d0+1)× (d0+1) matrices, such that the non-decreasing process Av,a in
the decomposition (7.8) is of the form
Av,at =
∫ t
0
(
Gobsd0 (s,Z
obs
s ,Γ
obs
s )−gobsd0 (s,Zobss ,Γobss ,vP
v
s ,a
Pv,a
s )
)
ds, Pv,a−a.s.
We now recall that ξT is assumed to be Fobs-measurable. Hence, under Assumption 7.1, plugging
the explicit expression of Av,a into (7.8), we see that we necessarily have Zobs−− = 0 and Γobs−− = 0.
We deduce from the representation of Av,a and (7.8) that for any P ∈P
UA(ξT ) = V A,w0 exp
[
−RA
∫ T
0
(
1
2
Tr
[(
Γobss +RAZ
obs
s (Z
obs
s )
T)d〈Bobs〉s]−Gobsd0 (s,Zobss ,Γobss ))ds]
× exp
[
−RA
∫ T
0
Zobss ·dBobss
]
, Pv,a−a.s.
Now, let us define for any (v,a) ∈U
Zobs,v,a(B·) := Zobs(Bobs,v,a(B·)), Γobs,v,a(B·) := Γobs(Bobs,v,a(B·)).
Then, we deduce by definition of Pv,a that
UA(ξT ) = −V A,w0 exp
[
−RA
∫ T
0
1
2
Tr
[(
Γobs,v,as +RAZ
obs,v,a
s (Z
obs,v,a
s )
T)d〈Bobs,v,a〉s]ds]
× exp
[
−RA
(
−
∫ T
0
Gobsd0 (s,Z
obs,v,a
s ,Γ
obs,v,a
s )ds+
∫ T
0
Zobs,v,as ·dBobs,v,as
)]
, P0−a.s.,
which is exactly the form given in (4.15).
Step 3: The case of uncontrolled volatility (Holmstrom-Milgrom 1987).
Let us assume now that the set V is reduced to the singleton {v0} ⊂ Rm. In this case, the value
function of the agent can be rewritten, for any admissible a, as
V A,w,at := essup
(v0,a
′
)∈U (t,(v0,a))
EP
v0,a
′
t
[
UA(ξT )eRAK
v0,a
′
t,T
]
, Pv0−a.s. (7.9)
For any a′ such that (v0,a′) ∈U (t,(v0,a)), define now
V A,w,a,a
′
t := EP
v0,a
′
t
[
UA(ξT )eRAK
v0,a
′
t,T
]
, Pv0−a.s.
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Then, V A,w,a,a
′
t is an F-martingale under Pv0,a
′
, so that by the martingale representation, there are
Rd0 and Rd−d0−1-valued predictable processes Z˜obs,a,a′ and Z˜obs−−,a,a′ such that
V A,w,a,a
′
t =UA(ξT )+
∫ T
t
RAV A,w,a,a
′
s k(v0,a
′
s)ds−
∫ T
t
e−RAK
v0,a
′
0,s Z˜obs,a,a
′
s ·Σs(v0)dW a
′
s
−
∫ T
t
e−RAK
v0,a
′
0,s Z˜obs−−,a,a
′
s ·Σ⊥s (v0)dW a
′
s , Pv0−a.s.
By definition of W a
′
, we deduce that, Pv0−a.s.,
V A,w,a,a
′
t =UA(ξT )−
∫ T
t
RAV A,w,a,a
′
s
(
µs(v0,a′s) ·Zobs,a,a
′
s + `s(v0,a
′
s) ·Zobs−−,a,a
′
s − k(v0,a′s)
)
ds
+
∫ T
t
RAV A,w,a,a
′
s Z
obs,a,a′
s ·Σs(v0)dWs+
∫ T
t
RAV A,w,a,a
′
s Z
obs−−,a,a′
s ·Σ⊥s (v0)dWs,
where we defined
Zobs,a,a
′
t :=−
e−RAK
v0,a
′
0,t
RAV
A,w,a,a′
t
Z˜obs,a,a
′
t , Z
obs−−,a,a′
t :=−
e−RAK
v0,a
′
0,t
RAV
A,w,a,a′
t
Z˜obs−−,a,a
′
t .
Let us now simplify everything a bit by setting (remember that V A,w,a,a
′
t is negative by definition)
Y a,a
′
t :=−
ln
(
−V A,w,a,a′t
)
RA
.
Then by Itoˆ’s formula, we deduce that the following holds, Pv0−a.s.,
Y a,a
′
t =
log(−UA(ξT ))
RA
+
∫ T
t
(
− RA
2
∥∥∥ΣTs (v0)Zobs,a,a′s ∥∥∥2+µs(v0,a′s) ·Zobs,a,a′s + `s(v0,a′s) ·Zobs−−,a,a′s
− k(v0,a′s)
)
ds−
∫ T
t
Zobs,a,a
′
s ·Σs(v0)dWs−
∫ T
t
Zobs−−,a,a
′
s ·Σ⊥s (v0)dWs.
The above equation can be identified as a linear-quadratic backward SDE with terminal condition
log(−UA(ξT ))/RA. Therefore, using the theory of BSDEs with quadratic growth, and in particular
the corresponding comparison theorem (see for instance El Karoui, Peng, Quenez (1997), Koby-
lanski (2000) and Briand and Hu (2008)), we deduce that if UA(ξT ) has second order moments
under Pv0 and if we define
Y at := essup
(v0,a′)∈U (t,(v0,a))
Y a,a
′
t ,
then there exists a Fobs-predictable process Za and a Fobs−−-predictable process Zobs−−,a such that,
Pv0−a.s.,
Y at =
log(−UA(ξT ))
RA
+
∫ T
t
sup
a∈A
{
µs(v0,a) ·Zobs,as + `s(v0,a) ·Zobs−−,as − k(v0,a)
}
ds
−
∫ T
t
RA
2
(∥∥ΣTs (v0)Zobs,as ∥∥2+∥∥Zobs−−,as ∥∥2)ds−∫ T
t
Zobs,as ·Σs(v0)dWs−Zobs−−,as ·Σ⊥s (v0)dWs,
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that is (Y a,Zobs,a,Zobs−−,a) solves the backward SDE with terminal condition log(−UA(ξT ))/RA and
generator f , where
f (s,z1,z1) :=−RA
2
(∥∥ΣTs (v0)z1∥∥2+∥∥z2∥∥2)+ sup
a∈A
{
µs(v0,a) · z1+ `s(v0,a) · z2− k(v0,a)
}
.
By the assumptions of the theorem on then cost function k, it can be easily shown, using the linear
growth of µ and ` in a, that the sup in the definition of f is always attained for some a∗(s,z1,z2)
that satisfies ∥∥a∗(s,z1,z2)∥∥≤C0(1+∥∥z1∥∥ 1ε +∥∥z2∥∥ 1ε) .
In particular this implies that the above BSDE is quadratic in z, and is therefore indeed well-posed.
Finally, we deduce that
V A,w,at = V
A,w
0 exp
[
−RA
∫ t
0
(
k(v0,as)−µs(v0,as) ·Zobs,as − `s(v0,as) ·Zobs−−,as
)
ds
]
× exp
[
−R
2
A
2
∫ t
0
(∥∥ΣTs (v0)Zobs,a∥∥2+∥∥Zobs−−,as ∥∥2)ds+RAAat ]
× exp
[
−RA
(∫ t
0
Zobs,as ·Σs(v0)dWs+
∫ t
0
Zobs−−,as ·Σ⊥s (v0)dWs
)]
, Pv0−a.s.,
where the non-decreasing process Aa is defined by
Aat =
∫ t
0
sup
a∈A
{
µs(v0,a) ·Zobs,as + `s(v0,a) ·Zobs−−,as − k(v0,a)
− RA
2
(∥∥ΣTs (v0)Zobs,as ∥∥2+∥∥Zobs−−,as ∥∥2)}ds
−
∫ t
0
(
µs(v0,as) ·Zobs,as + `s(v0,as) ·Zobs−−,as − k(v0,as)
− RA
2
(∥∥ΣTs (v0)Zobs,as ∥∥2+∥∥Zobs−−,as ∥∥2))ds, Pv0−a.s.
Again, we must have Zobs−−,a = 0 in order to ensure that ξT isF obsT -measurable, so that we have
Aat =
∫ t
0
(
Gobsd0 (s,Z
obs
s ,0)−gobsd0 (s,Zobss ,0,v0,as)
)
ds, Pv0−a.s.,
which means that Assumption 7.1 is satisfied. 2
Proof of Proposition 4.2. Notice first that the assumption on k implies that it has a super quadratic
growth at infinity, which means that for every (z,γ) ∈ R2×S2, the infimum in the definition of
Gobs1 (z,γ) is always attained for at least one v
∗(z,γ). Moreover, as it is then an interior maximizer,
it necessarily satisfies the first-order conditions, which can be rewritten here as
Mz+ γM˜v∗(z,γ)−∇k(v∗(z,γ)) = 0, (7.10)
for some matrices M and M˜, independent of (z,γ).
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In particular, the above shows that v∗(z,γ) cannot remain bounded as ‖z‖ and ‖γ‖ go to +∞. Let
us also verify that we have
‖v∗(z,γ)‖ ≤C0
(
1+‖z‖ 11+ε +‖γ‖ 1ε
)
,
for some constant C0 > 0.
Indeed assume first that ‖v∗(z,γ)‖/‖z‖ 11+ε does not remain bounded when ‖z‖ goes to +∞. Then,
we deduce from (7.10) that
M
z
‖z‖ 11+ε
+ γM˜
v∗(z,γ)
‖z‖ 11+ε
− ∇k(v
∗(z,γ))
‖v∗(z,γ)‖1+ε
‖v∗(z,γ)‖1+ε
‖z‖ ‖z‖
ε
1+ε = 0.
As ‖z‖ goes to +∞, the third term above then clearly dominates the other two, which contradicts
the fact that their sum should be 0.
Similarly, if we assume that ‖v∗(z,γ)‖/‖γ‖ 1ε does not remain bounded when ‖γ‖ goes to +∞, we
deduce that
M
z
|γ| 1ε
+ γM˜
v∗(z,γ)
‖γ‖ 1ε
− ∇k(v
∗(z,γ))
‖v∗(z,γ)‖1+ε
‖v∗(z,γ)‖1+ε
‖γ‖ 1+εε
‖γ‖= 0.
Again, the third term dominates the others as ‖γ‖ goes to +∞, which contradicts the equality.
We next deduce that for every η > 0
‖v∗(z,γ)‖
1+‖z‖ 11+ε−η +‖γ‖ 1ε−η
is not bounded as ‖z‖ and ‖γ‖ go to +∞.
Indeed, if we assume that ‖v∗(z,γ)‖/‖z‖ 11+ε−η remains bounded near infinity, then dividing (7.10)
by ‖z‖1/(1+ε)−η , we obtain that the first term behaves, as ‖z‖ goes to +∞, like ‖z‖ε/(1+ε)+η , while
the second one is bounded and the third one behaves like ‖z‖ε/(1+ε)−εη . Hence, the first term
dominates and we again have a contradiction. The result for the growth with respect to γ is proved
in the same manner.
From the above growth for v∗(z,γ), it is clear that the dominating terms at infinity in (4.18) are
1
2
‖θ ∗(Z,Γ)‖2 RA
(
ZX
)2
,
RP
2
‖θ ∗(Z,Γ)‖2 (1−ZX)2 , and k(v∗(z,γ)),
which are all non-negative. In particular, (4.18) goes to +∞ as ‖z‖ and ‖γ‖ go to +∞, and the
minimum is therefore attained. 2
Proposition 7.1. (Sufficient conditions for the existence of optimal v in the non-contractible
case.) Suppose a = 0 and B1 cannot be contracted upon. Let I be the subset of {1, . . . ,d} such
that for every j ∈ I , β j = miniβi and assume that b j 6= 0 for j ∈ I . If either of the following
holds
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(i) Card(I )> 1 and there is at least one pair (i, j) ∈I ×I such that α jβ j/b j 6= αiβi/bi.
(ii) Card(I )≥ 1, for all (i, j) ∈I ×I , i 6= j, α jβ j/b j = αiβi/bi =: η and
(1+η)2 (∑i∈I bi)
2
2
(
Card(I )RAη2+Card(I )RP (1−η)2+∑i∈I βi
) + ∑
i/∈I
(bi+αiβi)
−ηbi+αiβi
βi−min j β j
− 1
2 ∑i/∈I
(−ηbi+αiβi)2
(βi−min j β j)2
(
RAη2+RP (1−η)2+βi
)
≤
d
∑
i=1
(bi+αiβi)2
2(βi+RA)
.
Then, there exists at least one couple (Z∗,Γ∗) ∈ R× (−∞,miniβi) attaining the maximum in the
principal’s problem ††† .
Proof of Proposition 7.1. If for some i, we have Γ−βi > 0, or Γ−βi = 0, but Z 6= 0, it is easily
verified that the agent chooses optimally |v∗i (Z,Γ)| = ∞, and that this cannot be optimal for the
principal. Thus, we can optimize under the constraint Γ−min j β j ≤ 0.
In the case in which Γ− βi = 0 for some i and Z = 0, the principal has to maximize over all
admissible values of vi, because the agent is indifferent among those. It can be verified that for
Z = 0 and in that case there exists an optimal v∗ for the problem (5.20).
The only remaining case is Γ−βi < 0 for all i. Then, the contract is incentive compatible for
v∗i (Z,Γ) =
biZ+αiβi
βi−Γ , i = 1, . . . ,d.
From (5.20), the principal’s problem is then to maximize
v∗ ·b− 1
2
‖v∗‖2 (RAZ2+RP(1−Z)2)− 12 d∑i=1βi (v∗i −αi)2 ,
which is the same as maximizing
f (Z,Γ) :=
d
∑
i=1
(bi+αiβi)
biZ+αiβi
βi−Γ −
1
2
d
∑
i=1
(biZ+αiβi)2
(βi−Γ)2
(
RAZ2+RP(1−Z)2+βi
)
. (7.11)
We will show that the maximization of (7.11) over all (Z,Γ) ∈ R× (−∞,miniβi) can be reduced
to a maximization over a compact set strictly included in R× (−∞,miniβi). First, notice that by
taking (Z,Γ) = (1,−RA), (7.11) becomes
d
∑
i=1
(bi+αiβi)2
2(βi+RA)
≥ 0,
which implies that the maximum in (7.11) is non-negative.
†††Notice that the left-hand side in (ii) above can be made negative, if for instance Card(I )≤ d−1 and mini/∈I βi
is sufficiently close to miniβi, so that the condition can, indeed, be satisfied in examples.
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Let us now show that the maximum in (7.11) can never be achieved on the boundary of the domain
R× (−∞,miniβi). Let us distinguish several cases:
(i) Z goes to ±∞ and Γ remains bounded and does not go to miniβi. Then, it is easily seen that f
goes to −∞. This is therefore suboptimal.
(ii) Z remains bounded and Γ goes to −∞. Then, f goes to 0 which is again suboptimal.
(iii) Z goes to ±∞ and Γ goes to −∞. Then, f can either go to −∞ or 0, depending on whether
Z/Γ remains bounded or not.
(iv) Γ goes to miniβi and Z goes to ±∞. Then, f goes to −∞.
(v) Γ goes to miniβi and Z remains bounded. Then, we have to distinguish between three sub-
cases.
• If Z is fixed and Z 6=−α jβ j/b j, for every j ∈I , then, f goes to −∞.
• If Z goes to −α jβ j/b j for some j ∈I , Card(I )> 1 and there is at least one j0 ∈I \{ j}
such that α j0β j0/b j0 6= α jβ j/b j. Then, f still goes to −∞.
• If Z goes to −α jβ j/b j for some j ∈ I , Card(I ) ≥ 1 and for all (i, j) ∈ I ×I , i 6= j,
α jβ j/b j = αiβi/bi =: η , then, if
b jZ+α jβ j
β j−Γ goes to ±∞, then, f goes to −∞. If
b jZ+α jβ j
β j−Γ
remains bounded, then, the maximum value that can be achieved by f is
sup
u∈R
{
(1+η) ∑
i∈I
biu− 12u
2
(
Card(I )RAη2+Card(I )RP (1−η)2+ ∑
i∈I
βi
)}
+
d
∑
i/∈I
(bi+αiβi)
−α jβ jbib j +αiβi
βi−β j
− 1
2
d
∑
i/∈I
(−α jβ jbib j +αiβi)2
(βi−β j)2
(
RA
(
α jβ j
b j
)2
+RP
(
1− α jβ j
b j
)2
+βi
)
,
which is equal to
(1+η)2 (∑i∈I bi)
2
2
(
Card(I )RAη2+Card(I )RP (1−η)2+∑i∈I βi
) + ∑
i/∈I
(bi+αiβi)
−ηbi+αiβi
βi−min j β j
− 1
2 ∑i/∈I
(−ηbi+αiβi)2
(βi−min j β j)2
(
RAη2+RP (1−η)2+βi
)
. (7.12)
However, by assumption, this is again sub-optimal.
2
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